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THE CLEAR ACT: WHEN THE WARS ON TERRORISM AND
IMMIGRATION COLLIDE

Maha M Ayesh
I.

Introduction

In the summer of 2003, Representative Charles
Norwood (GA) first introduced the controversial house bill
titled the Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien
Removal Act (hereinafter "the CLEAR Act").' Though the
original Act expired with the 108th Congress,
Representative Norwood reintroduced the bill in the
summer of 2005. 2
The CLEAR Act was designed to
address "the growing U.S. criminal alien crisis." 3 In
particular, the Act focuses on perceived inadequacies in the
current system of enforcing immigration laws. 4 It seeks to
improve immigration enforcement by incorporating the
help of state and local police in applying stricter penalties
to those who violate immigration laws.
The present legislation grew largely out of concerns
following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. While
there had been a perceived crisis of illegal immigration
' Clear Law Enforcement For Criminal Alien Removal (CLEAR) Act
of

2003,

H.R.

2671,

108th

Cong.

(2003),

available

at

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:H.R.2671: (last visited May
24, 2006); See Press Release, Congressman Charlie Norwood,
Norwood Introduces the CLEAR Act (July 9, 2003), available at

http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ga09_norwood/CLEARAct.html
!last visited May 24, 2006).
Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal (CLEAR) Act of
2005,

H.R.

3137,

109th

Cong.

(2005),

available

at

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.3137: (last visited May
24, 2006). See Press release, Congressman Charlie Norwood, CLEAR
Act 2005 Introduced in U.S. House (June 30, 2005), availableat

http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ga09-norwood/CLEAR05.html
last visited May 24, 2006).
Press Release, Norwood, July 9, 2003, supra note 1.
4Id. (referring to "[tioday's broken enforcement system").
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predating this time,5 the horrifying and unexpected attacks
of 2001 drew national attention to immigration issues6
because all nineteen hijackers were foreign nationals.
After news broke just days later that at least sixteen of the
hijackers entered the country on legal visas, and that some
remained in violation of their visas, many began to feel
uneasy about terrorists taking "advantage of America's
open society.",7 In the months following the attacks, many
people blamed the inefficiencies on the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), the federal agency charged
with regulating immigration. 8 Furthermore, news that three
of the hijackers had encounters with local police officers in
the weeks preceding the attacks led many to question
whether increased communication and cooperation between
various law enforcement agencies could have foiled the
terrorist plot. 9 The CLEAR Act addresses this latter issue
by affirming the authority of state and local law
5See Clear Law Enforcementfor CriminalAlien Removal Act of 2003
(CLEAR Act): HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border
Sec., and Claims of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1
(2003) [hereinafter CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing] (statement by Rep.
Hostetler, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Immigration, Border See.,
and Claims) (referring to the "illegal immigration crisis of epic
proportions" and citing INS illegal immigrant statistics from 1996); see
also discussion infra Part II.B.
6 CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing,supra note 5, at 22 (prepared statement of
Kris W. Kobach, Assoc. Professor of Law).
7 See Peter Slevin & Mary Beth Sheridan, Suspects Entered U.S. on
Legal Visas, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at A6; see also Donna
Leinwand, ForeignersLinked to Terror Tricked INS, Report Says, USA
TODAY, May 22, 2002, at 8A (reporting that at least half of forty-eight
terrorism suspects since 1993 "manipulated or violated immigration
laws").
8 Leinwand, supra note 7 (citing report's "unflattering portrayal of the
INS").
9 See State and Local Authority to Enforce Immigration Law:
Evaluating a Unified Approach for Stopping Terrorists, Testimony
before the United States Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Immigration, Border Sec., and Citizenship (Apr. 22, 2004) (prepared
at
available
Malkin),
Michelle
by
statement
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=l 156 (last visited May 24,
2006).
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enforcement officers to enforce federal immigration laws;' 0
by providing states and local agencies with incentives to
enforce immigration laws;" and by establishing a system
to facilitate communication about immigration violators
among federal, state, and local agencies. 12 In addition, the
CLEAR Act amends existing immigration laws by creating
and increasing criminal and civil penalties for immigration
violations. 13
Supporters of the CLEAR Act applaud it as a
solution to the limited resources of federal immigration
officials and as a measure to stop the growing number of
"illegal aliens."' 14
On the other hand, immigration
advocates and many others oppose the measure, fearing
that it represents a growing assault on immigration, has
negative civil rights repercussions, and frustrates current
police objectives. 15 To be sure, the CLEAR Act has
'0 H.R. 3137 § 2.
" Id. §§ 3, 7.
12 Id. §§ 5-6.
13

Id. § 4.

14See, e.g., NumbersUSA, HOT TOPIC: State and Local Police in
Immigration
Law
Enforcement,

http://numbersusa.com/hottopic/clearact.html (last visited May 24,
2006). Many immigrant advocates object to the categorization of
certain non-citizens as "illegal." See Ruben J. Garcia, Comment,
Critical Race Theory and Proposition 187: The Racial Politics of
Immigration Law, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 118, 118 n.1 (1995);
Margot Mendelson, The Legal Production of Identities: A Narrative

Analysis of Conversations with Battered Undocumented Women, 19
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 138, 202-03 (2004). While I prefer using the
phrase "undocumented immigrants" to refer to non-citizens in the
country without authorization of federal immigration officials, I also
use the terms "illegal alien" and "illegal immigrant" when referring to
specific provisions of legislation and to public debate. It should be
noted, however, that the terms "alien" and "immigrant" have different
legal meanings. See generally 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens §
901 (2005).
15See ACLU Statement on H.R. 2671, the "Clear Law Enforcement for
Criminal Alien Removal (CLEAR) Act of 2003" before the House
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec. and Claims (Oct. 1, 2003),
available
at
http://www.aclu.org/ImmigrantsRights/ImmigrantsRights.cfm?ID=138
81&c=22 (last visited May 24, 2006).
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provided another avenue of discussion in the highly
debated field of immigration policy. Although this debate
preceded the 9/11 attacks, it has gained strength in its
aftermath.
This comment will briefly review the development
of relevant immigration law, focusing particularly on
legislation aimed at solving the "illegal immigration
It will also discuss how the 9/11 attacks
problem."
policy by framing the immigration
immigration
impacted
debate in the language of national security. As a result,
immigration policy has become inextricably linked with
anti-terrorism policy and no longer has "an independent
policy agenda."'1 6 The CLEAR Act exemplifies this
intertwining; it represents the combination of post-9/11
anti-immigration
terrorism concerns and pre-9/11
sentiment. Although the legislation is promoted as a
measure to increase the security and welfare of America's
citizens, it has the potential to promote racial and ethnic
profiling and to actually frustrate local law enforcement
efforts. This comment does not address the important legal
question of whether local and state law enforcement
agencies do indeed have the authority to enforce federal
immigration laws, as the CLEAR Act maintains. 17 Rather,
it focuses on the CLEAR Act's policy implications. This
comment attempts to show that not only is the CLEAR Act
potentially dangerous legislation in and of itself, but
Karen C. Tumlin, Comment, Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy is
ReshapingImmigration Policy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1173, 1228 (2004).
17 For information on whether federal law preempts local and state
authorities from enforcing immigration law, see generally Jill Keblawi,
Comment, Immigration Arrests by Local Police: Inherent Authority or
Inherently Preempted?, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 817 (2004); see also,
April McKenzie, Comment, A Nation of Immigrants or a Nation of
Suspects? State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws
Since 9/11, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1149, 1151-55 (2004); Craig B. Mousin, A
Clear View from the Prairie: Harold Washington & the People of
Illinois Respond to FederalEncroachment of Human Rights, 29 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 285, 305-06 (2005); Jeff Sessions & Cynthia Hayden, The
Growing Role for State & Local Law Enforcement in the Realm of
ImmigrationLaw, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 323 (2005).
16

4
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perhaps more importantly, it is premised on bad policythe policy of equating immigrants with terrorists and
criminals.
II.

Historical and Legal Development
A. Federal Government's Broad Exclusion
Powers

Immigration has been an area of law governed
almost exclusively by federal legislation and executive
regulations.1 8 In fact, courts have taken a decisively handsoff approach to most immigration matters through the use
of the plenary power doctrine, which limits judicial
oversight. 19 Viewed as a nation's right to control who
enters and remains within its territory, immigration laws
have long been perceived as intimately related to the
sovereign powers of the federal government. 20 In addition,
18 But see Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration
Laws: ProceduralSurrogatesfor Substantive ConstitutionalRights, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 1625, 1627-28 (1992) (noting that in recent years the
judiciary has been involved in an increasing number of cases involving
immigrants, particularly cases related to equal protection of the laws
and freedom from detention).
19 Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform
Act, and IdeologicalRegulation in the Immigration Laws: Important
Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 833, 840
1997); Motomura, supra note 18, at 1626.
o See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (finding the
power of Congress to control immigration to be "very broad, touching
as it does basic aspects of national sovereignty, more particularly our
foreign relations and the national security"); Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezel, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) ("Courts have long
recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental
sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political
departments largely immune from judicial control."); Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) ("[E]very sovereign nation has the
power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to
forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them
only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to
prescribe."); Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130
U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (reasserting "the power of the government to

5
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linked to
immigration laws are often seen as inextricably
21
relations.
foreign
nation's
and impacting the
At the most fundamental level, illegal immigration
has existed since legal immigration has been restricted, and
has existed since groups of non-citizens have been
excluded from legal entry into, or continued residence
within, the United States. Early immigration enactments
in the United States sought to restrict immigration by
certain ethnic or national groups. 23 In the nineteenth
century, for example, lawmakers enacted the "Chinese
exclusion laws," which placed a moratorium on entry by
In 1924, Congress passed a
Chinese laborers.24
comprehensive immigration policy based on a national
origins quota system, 2 5 which apparently was intended to
regulate the ethnic composition of immigrants. 2' This
national quota system remained the underlying principle of
U.S. immigration law until 1965.
exclude foreigners from the country whenever, in its judgment, the
ublic interests require such exclusion").
See Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530; see also Victor Romero, Race,
Immigration, & the Department of HomelandSecurity, 19 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 51, 53-54 (2004) (noting that immigration issues
have been ruled political matters in part because of "the extent that the
migration of noncitizens impacts foreign relations").
22 Illegal immigrants fall into two general categories: those who enter
the country without passing through inspection and being granted
permission from federal authorities and those who lawfully enter the
country on legal visas but remain in violation of their visas.
23 For a discussion of the historic role of race in U.S. immigration law,
see David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 988-94 (2002);
Romero, supra note 21, at 54.
21 See Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Ping, 130 U.S. 581.
The Supreme Court found such exclusion, which was based on the
presence of "foreigners of a different race" whose lack of assimilation
presented a danger to peace and security, to be within the sovereign
? owers of the national government. Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
43 Stat. 153 (1924), repealed by INA Amendments of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911.
26 Cole, supra note 23, at 991 (recounting statement of the
Commissioner of Immigration in 1925 that "virtually all immigrants
now 'looked' like Americans") (citing THOMAS ALEXANDER
ALIENIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, & HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION

AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 165 (4th ed. 1998)).

6
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Early immigration laws also sought to prevent
alleged politically subversive foreigners from infiltrating
society. Many scholars argue that immigration laws were
constructed, and groups of immigrants excluded, in
response to domestic social change and international
conflict. 28 For example, Congress responded to the
assassination of President McKinlei in 1902 with
immigration laws excluding anarchists. 9 Anarchists were
also the target of legislation in the early twentieth century
in response to such events as the Haymarket Square rally in
Chicago and the rise of the Wobblies. 30 By the 1940s and
1950s, immigration legislation focused on deporting and
excluding Communists. 31
In 1952, Congress passed the comprehensive
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which continues to
be the foundation of U.S. immigration law today. 32 The
INA originally retained the "national origins formula" that
was established in 1924 for regulating immigration and
included earlier acts governing the exclusion and
deportation of certain immigrants. In 1965, Congress
amended the INA to exclude discrimination
based on such
33
criteria as race and national origins.

27

The earliest examples of laws limiting "politically undesirable
persons" may have been the Alien and Sedition Acts of the lateeighteenth century. Johnson, supra note 19, at 834.
28/d.

29 Cole, supra note 23, at 994.
30 Johnson, supra note 19, at 845-47.
31 Id.at 850-51.

32 Immigration & Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2003)).

31 Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965).

7
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B. Tackling the "Illegal Immigration
Problem"
1.

Development of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act

Until the 1970s, legislation dealing with illegal
immigration focused primarily on enforcing penalties
against those who smuggled and harbored illegal
immigrants. Under the INA, it was a felony to willfully
import, transport, or harbor an undocumented immigrant,
penalties. 34
though it specifically exempted employers from
Over time, lawmakers increasingly focused on the growing
number of undocumented immigrants in the country, the
Legislative
majority of whom came from Mexico. 35
ninetythe
1971,
in
and
increased,
activity in this area
36
issue.
the
on
hearings
holding
began
second Congress
Much attention was given to the effects of immigration,
particularly undocumented immigration, on the nation's
labor market. 37 The common understanding was that
immigrant laborers from economically deprived countries
depressed the American labor market and increased
unemployment among low-skill citizens by taking lowwage jobs. 38 Thus, lawmakers decided that legislation
14

H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 51-52 (1986), reprinted in 1986

U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5655-56 (citing INA (1952) §§ 274, 287(a)(3)).

35 See Barry R. Chiswick, The Illegal Immigration Policy Dilemma, in

73, 75 (Susan Pozo ed.,
W.E. Upjohn Inst. for Employment Research 1986). But see Charles J.
ESSAYS ON LEGAL AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

Ogletree, Jr., Conference Paper, America 's Schizophrenic Immigration
Policy: Race, Class, and Reason, 41 B.C. L. REV. 755, 767 (2000)

("While the stereotypical image of an illegal immigrant is of a Latino
crossing the U.S. border at night, more than 40% of illegal immigrants
are actually people who entered the country legally but overstayed their
visas.").
36 H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 52.
37 See generally George J. Borjas, Immigrants and the U.S. Labor
Market, in ESSAYS ON LEGAL AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 7 (Susan

Pozo ed., W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 1986).
38 But see Thomas J. Espenshade, Unauthorized Immigration to the

8
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aimed at decreasing the flow of illegal immigration was
necessary "both to protect U.S. labor and economy, and to
39
assure the orderly entry of immigrants into this country."
Various bills dealing with illegal immigration were
introduced in the House and Senate throughout the 1970s
and into the 1980s.4 ° Little headway was made, however,
often because the two branches of the legislature could not
agree on final resolutions.41 One law that did pass was the
Act of October 5, 1978.42 This Act created the Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy to study
the current state of immigration law and to report its
findings and recommendations
for reform to the President
43
Congress.
and
In March 1981, the Commission published its final
report, an which affirmed the notion that undocumented
immigrants are attracted primarily by employment
opportunities.45 It discussed the "pernicious effects" of
undocumented immigration on society, which it argued led
to the creation of an underclass of workers who are "at the
mercy of unscrupulous employers and coyotes who
smuggle them across the border. 4 6 The Commission saw
the most devastating impact of widespread undocumented
United States, 21 ANN. REv. Soc. 195, 210 (1995) (arguing that
undocumented immigrants actually "help generate employment for
others through their work and consumption" and that studies show
undocumented immigrants to have contributed to federal budgetary
surpluses, rather than deficits).
39 See H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 52 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-506, at 3
11975)).
oSee id. at 52-55.

41Id.

42 Pub. L. No. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907 (1978).
43 H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 53.
44 SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NAT'L INTEREST: THE FINAL REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION
AND REFUGEE POLICY WITH SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS BY COMM'RS (U.S.

Gov't
Printing Office 1980).
45
1Id. at 41.
46
Id. at 41-42.

9
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immigration to be "the disregard it breeds for other U.S.
laws," including minimum wage, occupational safety, and
anti-smuggling laws.47 To counter this perceived problem,
the Commission recommended a three-part program that
included enhanced border and interior enforcement,
economic deterrents-specifically employer sanctions, and
for legalizing certain undocumented
a program
48
immigrants.
The Commission's recommendations and the
previous attempts at passing legislation culminated in the
enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA). 49 This Act emphasized employer sanctions
as a mechanism for decreasing illegal immigration. It made
the knowing employment of undocumented immigrants
unlawful, required employers to check certain documents
verifying legal status, and authorized a system of graduated
penalties for employers who violate the Act.5" This Act
also added an anti-discrimination provision to the INA, 5 1 in
order to prevent employers from discriminating on the basis
of national origin or citizenship (except for undocumented
immigrants) out of fear of liability. 52 IRCA further
established an amnesty program for certain undocumented
immigrants who had continuously resided in the United
States since January 1, 1982. 53 In passing this provision,
Congress reasoned that many undocumented immigrants,
who have resided in the country for several years and have
become beneficial members of society, continue to live in
47

48

Id. at 42.

1Id. at 45.

Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-603, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3359. Upon signing the law,
President Reagan called it "the product of one of the longest and most
difficult legislative undertakings in recent memory." Statement by
President Reagan upon signing S.1200, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5856-1,
5856-4.
50 IRCA § 101 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a).
51 Id. § 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324b).
52 H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 68.
53 IRCA § 201 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a).
49

10
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fear due to their undocumented status. 54 Granting legal
status to such immigrants would allow the55INS to focus on
curbing the current flow of illegal arrivals.
2. Immigration Policy in the 1990s
Significant legislation dealing with illegal
immigration did not surface again until the mid-1990s.
Many people refer to this time as a period of emerging antiimmigration and nativist sentiment, 56 as the tone of the
immigration debate dramatically changed in the decade
after the enactment of the IRCA. California Proposition
187, which was voted into law by a large margin of the
57
state's citizens in 1994, was of national significance.
This law was based on the assumption that California's
undocumented immigrant community caused economic
hardship to citizens and threatened the public through
criminal conduct. 58
Proposition 187 denied publicly
funded social 59 and health care services 60 and public
education to undocumented immigrants. 6 1 The law also
required the state's law enforcement agencies to "fully
cooperate" with the INS in its efforts to arrest
undocumented immigrants. 62
54 H.R. REP. No. 99-682,
55 Id. While immigrant

at 49.
advocates generally favor amnesty programs,
some fault the IRCA for constructing "the contemporary illegal
identity" by distinguishing the category of immigrants whose status
could be legalized from others. See Mendelson, supra note 14, at 203.
56 See generally, Leo R. Chavez, Immigration Reform and Nativism:
The Nationalist Response to the Transnationalist Challenge, in
IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRATION
IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 61 (Juan F. Perea ed., New York Univ.

Press 1997); Stephen H. Legomsky, E Pluribus Unum: Immigration,
Race, and OtherDeep Divides, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 101 (1996).
57 Cal. Prop. 187 (1994).
58
59 Id. § 1.
Id. § 5.
60
Id. § 6.
61 Id. § 7.
62 Id. § 4. Subsequent court decisions found that some of the provisions

11
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While Proposition 187 was not a piece of federal
legislation, its passage was important in shaping the
national immigration dialogue, 63 especially because
California has one of the nation's largest immigrant
communities. In fact, Proposition 187 likely influenced the
passage of certain provisions in the Personal Responsibility
and Work Reconciliation Act of 1996, which limited
federal public benefits for legal immigrants and excluded
benefits
from federal
immigrants
undocumented
64
Furthermore, Proposition 187 was passed by
programs.
such a large margin that it "sent a powerful message to
Congress regarding immigration as a powerful national
political issue. ' ' 65 Proving that they were "tough on
immigrants" 66 became a politically wise move for
lawmakers. Whereas a decade earlier legislators presented
an image of undocumented immigrants as victims of
merciless employers and smugglers, public discourse
shifted to accuse undocumented immigrants of being
dangerous elements of society who leached public
In addition, the discourse surrounding
resources.
disturbing
Proposition 187 and similar enactments carried
67
racial, particularly anti-Latino, undertones.
of Proposition 187 were unconstitutional or preempted by federal law.
See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755
(C.D. Cal. 1995), appeal dismissed in part, 131 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir.
1997).
63 See Chavez, supra note 56, at 65.
64 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, Title IV (1996).
65 Barbara Hines, So Near Yet So FarAway: The Effect of September
11th on Mexican Immigrants in the United States, 8 TEX. HisP. J.L. &
POL'Y 37, 39-40 (2002).
66 Id. at 40.
67 Statements made by supporters of Proposition 187 demonstrated fear
that the increasing Latino immigrant population threatened the majority
status of the region's white population. For instance, Glenn Spencer,
founder of the anti-immigrant group, Voice of Citizens Together,
feared that immigrants were "part of a reconquest of the American
Southwest by foreign Hispanics." Chavez, supra note 56, at 68
(quoting Gabe Martinez & Patrick J. McDonnell, Prop. 187 Forces
Rely on Message-Not Strategy, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, at A1). See
generally Garcia, supra note 14.

12
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In 1996, the 104th Congress, feeding off the antiimmigration sentiment present throughout the country,
enacted multiple pieces of legislation affecting immigrants.
This legislation reflected not only the growing concerns
about illegal immigration, but also the growing concerns
about terrorism and crime.
By 1996, America had
experienced two terrorist attacks: the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. In
response to growing concerns about terrorism and crime,
Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (hereinafter "AEDPA") in April 1996.68 Title
IV of the AEDPA focuses exclusively on immigrants, in
particular on the removal and exclusion of "alien terrorists"
and "criminal aliens." 69 Section 439 of the AEDPA
authorizes state and local law enforcement officials to
arrest and detain immigrants who had previously been
convicted of a felony in the United States.
Interestingly,
while the AEDPA focuses largely on excluding and
detaining immigrants who pose a potential terrorist threat,
an American citizen perpetrated the Oklahoma City
bombing-the most devastating terrorist attack the country
had suffered by this time.
Also in 1996, Congress signed the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(hereinafter "IIRIRA") into law as Division C of the
Omnibus Consolidation Appropriations Act of 1996.71 The
IIRIRA was the most significant piece of legislation
dealing with illegal immigration since the IRCA. This Act
used a system of tougher border patrol 72 and interior
68 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N (110 Stat.) 1214.
69

70

1d. §§ 401-43.

Id.§ 439.

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 3009.
72Id. §§ 101-12.
71

13
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enforcement 73 to deal with both illegal entry and expired
visas. Instead of attempting to deter the employment of
undocumented immigrants as the IRCA did, the IIRIRA
focused directly on deterring and punishing immigrants
through the use of civil, and in some limited instances
74
criminal, penalties against the immigrants themselves.
The IIRIRA also instructed the Attorney General to set up
an "automated entry and exit control system" to determine
whether temporary residents overstayed their visas.75
local law
While the AEDPA discussed
detaining
and
apprehending
in
involvement
enforcement's
criminal aliens, the IIRIRA went a step further by
discussing local law enforcement's involvement in
apprehending violators of civil immigration laws. The
IIRIRA adds a provision to the INA permitting the
Attorney General to enter into written agreements with
state or local officials to perform the functions of
immigration officers. 76 This provision requires, however,
that state or local officers "be qualified to perform" the
relevant functions of immigration officers, which includes
that they have had "adequate training." 77 The IIRIRA also
makes it clear that no agreement is necessary for a state or
local officer to report information to the Attorney General
with regard to someone's immigration status or to
cooperate with the Attorney General in identifying,
apprehending, detaining, or removing immigrants "not
lawfully present." 78 The first state to take advantage of this
73

1Id. §§ 131-34.
74 Id. §§ 105, 108

(codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 758). Section 105
places fines upon "any alien who is apprehended while entering (or
attempting to enter) the United States at any time or place other than as
designated by immigration officers . . . ." Id. § 105. Section 108
imposes criminal penalties on "high speed flight[s] from . . .
immigration checkpoint[s]." Id. § 108.
75
Id. § 110 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1221).
76 Id. § 133 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)).
7
7

78

Id.

Id. (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)).
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provision was Florida, six years after the IIRIRA passed. 79
Many immigration scholars and immigrant
advocates criticize the 1996 laws for being overly inclusive
and unnecessarily harsh on immigrants when the primary
aim was to prevent terrorism and crime.8 0
In the
legislators' drive to tackle "criminal aliens," they created
laws which severely penalized immigrants for crimes
committed years ago by making certain offenses automatic
grounds for deportation, regardless of when the offenses
occurred. 8I The 1996 legislation represents what many
refer to as the increasing "criminalization" of immigration
law, as the fields of criminal law and immigration law
became increasingly intertwined 8 2 It also represents the
growing tendency to equate illegal immigration with
criminality and terrorism.
III.

Immigration Policy at the Turn of the
Millennium

Despite the growing hostility toward immigrants in
the mid- 1990s, or perhaps because of it, immigrant
advocates appeared to be successful in changing the tone of
immigration policy by the end of the twentieth century.
The "draconian" 1996 legislation prompted immigrant
advocates to increase efforts to liberalize the nation's
immigration policy. 83 Many lawmakers also began to
79 McKenzie, supra note 17, at 1156.

In fact, upon signing the AEDPA into law, President Clinton himself
acknowledged the over-inclusiveness of the Act. Johnson, supra note
19, at 878 (citing Statement of the President on Signing the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 17 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 719 (Apr. 24, 1996) (stating that the AEDPA
"makes a number of major, ill-advised changes in our immigration laws
having nothing to do with fighting terrorism")).
81 Id.
82 See generally Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of
80

Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 669 (1997).
83

Hines, supra note 65, at 39, 40.
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second-guess the wisdom of the 1996 laws. 14 In the
beginning of the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court
struck down some of the provisions of the IIRIRA as
Also important, public attitudes toward
invalid.8 5
by 2000.86
improved
immigrants
Barbara Hines and Michael Welch credit two
factors for influencing attitudes toward immigrants. In the
late twentieth and early twenty-first century, the Hispanic
population was growing and it became increasingly clear
that this group would constitute an important political
constituency. 87 Second, the nation's economic condition
improved toward the end of the 1990s, which made
immigrants appear as less of an economic threat. 88 More
people saw low-wage immigrant workers as necessary for
filling labor shortages, rather than as workers who were
taking away citizens' jobs. 89 Moves were being made to
develop more temporary worker programs for Mexican
migratory workers, and as late as September 9, 2001,
bilateral talks between Mexico and the United States made
a new legalization program for undocumented immigrants
seem like a very real possibility. 9° By the fall of 2001,
immigrant advocates had high hopes that they would have
much success in reversing the tide of anti-immigration
legislation and policy.

84 Id. at 40; see also MICHAEL

WELCH, DETAINED: IMMIGRATION LAWS

INS JAIL COMPLEX 180 (2002).
85 Hines, supra note 65, at 40 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289
t2001); Zadvydas v. INS, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)).
6 WELCH, supra note 84, at 180.
87 Id.; see also Hines, supranote 65, at 41.
88 WELCH, supra note 84, at 180 (discussing the shift in public opinion
polls which showed that in 1994, 63% of the public saw immigrants as
"an economic drain on the country," and that in 2000, only 38% held
similar views); see also Hines, supra note 65, at 41.
89 Hines, supra note 65, at 41.
90
Id. at 42.
AND THE EXPANDING
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Immigration Policy in the Aftermath of 9/11

Whatever the hopes of immigrant activists before
September 11, 2001, everything changed afterwards. Soon
afterward, President Bush announced that the nation would
be engaged in an unconventional "war" aimed at defeating
"the global terror network." 9 1
Part of the domestic
manifestation of this conflict was an immediate targeting of
immigrants and harshening of immigration laws. The 9/11
criminal
investigations
immediately
focused
on
immigrants, primarily men from predominantly Muslim
countries in the Middle East and South Asia. Although
none of the immigrants detained in the initial FBI
investigations were charged with connections to terrorism,
the INS, working with the FBI, used civil immigration laws
to detain, investigate, and deport aliens. 9 2 In addition,
Congress immediately reacted with legislation aimed at
deterring and punishing "terrorist attacks in the United
States and around the world" and enhancing "law
enforcement investigatory tools." 93 The USA PATRIOT
Act dramatically increased the federal government's
surveillance and investigative powers and also contained
many provisions affecting immigrants. For instance, it
expanded the ability to detain and deport non-citizens who
' 94
are deemed a "security risk."
91President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress
and the American People (Sept. 20, 2001) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html).
92 See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE
OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF
THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER I I

ATTACKS
(Apr.
2003),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/detainees.pdf [hereinafter OIG
Report].
93 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT)
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
94 See Patricia Medige, Immigration Issues in a Security-Minded
America, 33 COLO. LAW. 11, 19 (2004).
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While federal policy continued to apply increased
scrutiny to Arab and Muslim immigrants, 95 it appeared that
all immigrants came under scrutiny in post-9/1 1 America.
As news reports surfaced suggesting that improved
immigration enforcement and communication could have
provided clues to the hijackers and their plot,9 6 immigration
reform became an important battlefront in the "war on
terrorism." 97 The AEDPA indicated that policymakers had
already drawn a link between terrorism and immigration,
but this link was furthered after 9/11. The conceptual link
between immigration and terrorism is perhaps made most
clear by the abolishment of the INS and the reorganization
of its functions in the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), whose primary mission is preventing terrorist
attacks and reducing the country's vulnerability to
terrorism. 98 Furthermore, public opinion seemed to support
measures aimed at reducing immigration and more strictly
enforcing immigration laws. 99 Legislators soon began to
95 For example, the INS created a system of "special registration" in

2002 for male visa-holders from predominantly Muslim countries. 67
Fed. Reg. 52,584 (Aug. 12, 2002).
96 See, e.g., Philip Shenon & David Johnston, Two Agencies Say
Silence PreventedPair'sTracking, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2002, at A17.
97 Newspaper headlines and story placement reveal the popular
association between immigration and the war on terrorism. See, e.g.,
Matthew L. Wald, Officials Arrest 104 Airport Workers in Washington
Area, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2002, at A13 (discussing the arrests of
undocumented immigrant airport employees). Although this story did
not indicate that any of the employees were tied to terrorism, it
appeared in a feature section titled "A Nation Challenged."
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 § 111 (Nov.
25, 2002). The INS was dissolved, and its functions were replaced by
three DHS bureaus: the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), which handles immigration services; the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcements, which oversees the interior
enforcement functions; and the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, which polices the nation's borders. See Medige, supra note
94, at 11. Some immigration scholars, while alarmed by the placement
of immigration powers in the DHS, believe that the separation of
immigration service and enforcement functions into different agencies
is a positive change. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 21, at 51, 52.
99 See Hines, supra note 65, at 45 (discussing two public opinion polls
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attack any measures aimed at relaxing00 immigration laws as
potential threats to national security.
V.

The Proposed Legislation

In some ways, the CLEAR Act is a continuation of
the IIRIRA. The CLEAR Act seeks to punish immigration
violators by increasing the civil and criminal penalties
provided in the IIRIRA. 0 ' The 2005 bill goes even further
by completely criminalizing the unlawful presence of
immigrants; under the CLEAR Act of 2005,
it is a felony to
02
be in the country in violation of the INA. 1
This Act, however, handles the problem of limited
resources in a different way from its predecessors.
Whereas earlier legislation appropriated increased spending
for federal immigration enforcement, particularly border
patrol, 103 the new legislation seeks to incorporate resources
from outside federal immigration agencies. By authorizing
state and local agencies to carry out the functions of
immigration officers, hundreds of thousands of police
officers would be able to fill the large gaps left by the
04
limited number of federal immigration investigators.1
The bill does not stop at merely affirming the
authority of state and local law enforcement agencies to
enforce immigration laws; it establishes a program to
provide incentives for local police to enforce immigration
laws. Under the CLEAR Act, any state that has a statute,
conducted in aftermath of September 11th).

100
Id.
101H.R. 3137 § 4(b), (c).
102 H.R. 3137 § 4(a). The "felony" language is an addition to the initial

CLEAR Act of 2003, H.R. 2671.
'03 See IRCA § 111; IIRIRA §§ 101-103.
104 See Press Release, Norwood, June 30, 2005, supra note 2; see also
CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing,supra note 5, at 30 (prepared statement of
James R. Edwards, Ph.D.) (noting that 2,000 immigration investigators
currently cover the entire nation and that funding for interior
enforcement is only one-fifth the amount used for border enforcement).
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policy, or practice prohibiting law enforcement from

enforcing immigration laws will have certain federal funds
Any withheld funds would be
withheld from it. 10 5
reallocated to states that do comply with the Act's
provisions.1° 6 Furthermore, the bill requires state and local
law enforcement agencies to provide the Department of
Justice and the Department of Homeland Security with
information on detained immigration violators via the
National Crime Information Center database.' ° 7 The
CLEAR Act also requires that the DHS produce a training
manual, a "pocket guide," and training programs for use by
local law enforcement agencies.' 8 It does not, however,
require that state or local officers have any special trainin§
0
before assisting in federal immigration enforcement.'
Under the Act, state and local officers are given personal
and agency immunity for any liability arising out of the
110
enforcement of federal immigration law.
The CLEAR Act was first introduced in the House
of Representatives in 2003 and was referred to the House

Judiciary Committee where a hearing on it was held before
the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and
Claims. III Four witnesses were present at the hearing, with
all but one testifying in favor of the CLEAR Act.' 12 Still,
the hearing was far from being one-sided, as several3
Act. "
committee members spoke fervently against the
The CLEAR Act stalled in Congress and died despite
105 H.R. 3137 § 3(a).
16

Id. § 3(c).

10 7 Id. § 5.
108
id. § 10.
10 9 Id. § 10(e)(3).
10

' Id. § 110.

v.2.
111 Cong. Index 35,038 (2003-2004)
112 CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing,supra note 5.
113 See, e.g., id. at 3-6 (statements by Rep. Lee, Member, H. Subcomm.
on Immigration, Border Sec., and Claims), 6-8 (statements by Rep.
Sanchez, Member, H. Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., and
Claims), 9 (statements by Rep. Lofgren, Member, H. Subcomm. on
Immigration, Border Sec., and Claims).
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having 125 co-sponsors. 114
However, it was quickly
reintroduced in June 2005. The new legislation includes
changes that reflect some of the previous concerns
expressed about the Act,' 15 as well as provisions that
strengthen its impact. 116 At this writing, the CLEAR Act
7
has seventy-four co-sponsors. 11
The CLEAR Act's parallel in the Senate is the
Homeland
Security
Enhancement
Act (hereinafter
18
"HSEA").
The HSEA is also a carry-over from the
108th Congress. It was first introduced by Senator Jeff
Sessions (AL) on November 20, 2003,119 and reintroduced
in June 2005.120 The HSEA is substantially similar to the
CLEAR Act; in fact, the CLEAR Act of 2005 appears to
12 1
have been amended to more closely follow the HSEA.
At present, the HSEA has three sponsors.122
114 Bill Status & Summary for the 108th Congress, H.R.
2671,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d 108:HR02671 :@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited May
26, 2006).
115For example, apparently to address concerns that the legislation
would overburden police, the 2005 Act was amended to require the
DHS to pay training costs, H.R. 3137 § 10(d), while the 2003 Act
allowed for a fee to be charged, H.R. 2671 § 109(b)(1).
116
See supra note 104.
117 Bill Summary & Status for the 109th Congress, H.R. 3137,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:h.r.02671
(last visited
May 26, 2006).
118Homeland Security Enhancement Act (HSEA) of 2003, S. 1906,
108th
Cong.
(2003),
available
at
http://www.theorator.com/bills108/sl906.html
(last visited July 6,
2006); Homeland Security Enhancement Act (HSEA) of 2005, S. 1362,
109th Cong.
(2005),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/z?c 109:S. 1362: (last visited July 6, 2006).
119 Bill Status & Summary for the 108th Congress, S. 1906,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 08 :s.01906:
(last visited
May 26, 2006).
120 Bill Summary & Status for the 109th Congress, S.1362,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:s.01362:
(last visited
May 26, 2006).
121 One key difference is the HSEA makes "unlawful presence"
a
misdemeanor offense, while the CLEAR Act makes it a felony offense.
S. 1362 § 5(a); H.R. 3137 § 4(a).
122Bill Status & Summary, S. 1906, supra note 119.
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VI.

Potential Dangers of the Legislation

Opponents of the CLEAR Act have many
complaints and concerns about it. 123 Two of the most
frequently cited reasons for opposing the CLEAR Act as
bad policy are (1) that the Act would have the danger of
impairing the jobs of police; and (2) that the legislation
would likely lead to the abuse of non-citizens and ethnic
minorities.
A. Implications for Law Enforcement
Even those who support stricter penalties on
undocumented immigrants and strict enforcement of
immigration laws should recognize that the CLEAR Act
has the potential to do more harm than good. In particular,
the CLEAR Act could have a damaging impact upon state
and local law enforcement agencies by placing unnecessary
burdens upon them. The new law is unnecessary because
earlier legislation allowed room for local police to
cooperate with and assist federal immigration agents. 24 In
addition, local police are authorized to enforce criminal
laws against anyone, including undocumented immigrants,
and courts have held that local police are not precluded
from enforcing laws against immigrants. 12 5 The primary
job of state and local law enforcement, however, is
See, e.g., CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing, supra note 5, at 35-37
(statement of Gordon Quan, Mayor Pro Tern, Houston, TX); ACLU
Statement, supra note 15; People for the American Way, State and
Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Law: What Are the Issues?
http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=13338 (last visited
May 26, 2006).
124 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10) (2006).
125 See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983)
123

(holding that federal immigration law does not preempt every state
activity involving aliens); Zapeda v. U.S. Immigration &
Nationalization Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 731-32 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
that the INS is not prohibited from obtaining assistance from local
police agencies).
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protecting the public from criminal activity, not getting rid

of undocumented immigrants who are not committing
crimes.
Thus, the CLEAR Act would unnecessarily add an
extra burden to already taxed local agencies.' l 6 Not only
does it ask local officers to assist with federal immigration
investigations, it essentially authorizes them to act as
immigration agents. Furthermore, the Act would penalize
states and agencies by cutting funds if they chose not to
enforce immigration laws. 127 This essentially amounts to
coercing states to carry out supposedly voluntary
functions. 128 Since 9/11, police officers have been asked to
be the "first responders" to acts of terrorism. 129 Placing an
extra burden on them would make it increasingly difficult
for them both to be "first responders" and to continue the
normal duties of their work.
The CLEAR Act may further frustrate the efforts of
police by making their criminal investigation tasks more
difficult. In particular, many police departments fear that
by becoming quasi-immigration agents, they will lose trust
and respect within immigrant communities.' 30 As earlier
126 CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing, supra note 5,

at 38-39 (prepared

statement by Gordon Quan) (discussing the financial burdens state and
local police already face).
127 H.R. 3137 § 3(a).
128 CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Rep.
Hostetler, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec.,

and Claims) (discussing the discretion retained by police under the
Act); see also INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE

(IACP), Enforcing Immigration Law: The Role of State, Tribal and
Local
Law
Enforcement
5
(Nov.
30,
2004),

http://www.theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/Publications/ImmigrationEnfor
cementconf/o2Epdf (stating the position of the IACP that any
legislation enlisting the assistance of local police in immigration
enforcement "be based on completely voluntary cooperation" and not
"seek to coerce cooperation through the use of sanction mechanisms
that would withhold federal assistance funds").
129CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing, supra note 5, at 4 (statements by
Rep.
Lee).

130 See Laura Parker, Police Departments Balk at Idea of Becoming
"Quasi-INSAgents, "USA TODAY, May 7, 2002, at 8A.
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reports on illegal immigration noted, undocumented
immigrants are often afraid to approach police.131 Many
local law enforcement agencies have worked hard, and
continue to work hard, to gain the trust of immigrant
communities. 132 This is true even when local police do not
Undocumented
actively enforce immigration laws.
to inform
hesitant
immigrants will become even more
officers of crimes if they know that these officers routinely
interrogate people about their immigration status. This
would not only put victims at greater risk, but it would also
decrease the likelihood of apprehending many criminal
offenders. 133 For example, some police fear that the
CLEAR Act would make battered immigrant women less
likely to report domestic abuse. 134
The 2005 bill was amended to address some of
these concerns by clarifying that police are not requiredto
report or arrest crime victims or witnesses.135 It still,
however, gives police the freedom to do so, in part because
agencies concerned with preserving their federal funding
will want to prove that they are complying with the Act's
provisions. Furthermore, even if police do not report
victims or witnesses, the reputation of police as
immigration enforcers in other contexts likely will be
sufficient to deter immigrants from wanting any contact
with police. Being seen as immigration officers not only
has the potential to damage the police's relationship with
undocumented immigrants, but legal immigrants and
131See H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 49.
132 See CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing,supra note 5, at 185 (letter from Ray

Samuels, Chief of Police, Newark, CA).
133 See id. at 179-180 (letter from Ellen T. Hanson, Chief of Police,
Lenexa, KY).
134 IACP, supra note 128, at 5; see also Karin Almjeld, CLEAR Act
Threatens Immigrant Women Victims of Violence, NAT'L NOW TIMES
(Winter 2003-04), http://www.now.org/nnt/winter-2004/clear.html
(arguing that the CLEAR Act "would undermine the Violence Against
Women Act" and the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention
Act).
135 H.R. 3137 § 3(b).
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citizens may also lose their trust in the police upon hearing

the experiences of people they know being apprehended for
immigration offenses.
For such reasons, many police departments and law
enforcement organizations throughout the country oppose
the CLEAR Act. According to the Chief of Police of
Newark, California, "the CLEAR Act would make state
and local law enforcement officers' jobs nearly impossible
and move us further from36 the goal we all share of making
our communities safer."'
B. Civil Rights Implications
Another key concern about the CLEAR Act is that
it could lead to widespread civil rights violations and ethnic
profiling. Presumably, one of the goals of the legislation's
supporters is to put local police officers in a position to
discover illegal immigrants during the course of their work.
Supporters of the Act appear to support the proposition that
police officers could detain and question people based on a
suspicion of illegal immigration status. 37 What qualifies,
then, as justifiable or reasonable suspicion? Immigrants
today are identified largely by their race and ethnicity.
Professor Victor Romero explains that immigration in
America has been historically intertwined with race, and a
presumption remains that citizens are either white or black,

131 CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing, supra note 5, at 185 (letter from Ray

Samuels).
137 See id. at 40-45 (statements by Gordon Quan and Rep. Hostetler).
Rep. Hostetler asked Gordon Quan, Mayor Pro Tern and City Council

Member of Houston, a series of questions regarding Houston Police
Department policy.

Rep. Hostetler seemed unsatisfied with Quan's

answers that officers are not permitted to ask about citizenship status,
detain, or arrest someone based solely on a suspicion of illegal status,

though they can contact INS regarding someone known to be an illegal
immigrant who is arrested on separate criminal charges. Hostetler
seems to prefer a policy of questioning, and perhaps even detaining,
people based on suspicion.
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while non-citizens are Latino or Asian.' 38 To be sure, since
the elimination of the national origins quota system in
immigrants have come from Latin America and
1965, 13most
9
Asia.

The CLEAR Act's authorization thus presents the
danger that officers, who are under pressure by the Act to
uncover immigration violators, may question and even
detain people based solely on their ethnicity or assumed
ethnicity. 140 Because the Act immunizes local officers and
agencies from any civil liability arising from their
enforcement of immigration laws, 14 1 it provides a
convenient way to bypass judicial limitations on race and
42
ethnicity-based immigration enforcement.'
Proponents of the CLEAR Act and related measures
argue that police are already trained to avoid racial
profiling. 143 It is true that, prior to the 9/11 attacks, law
enforcement agencies around the country appeared
increasingly concerned with the problems of racial
profiling.144 It is also true, however, that racial profiling
145
has long been practiced by law enforcement.
Furthermore, attitudes toward racial and ethnic profiling
138 Romero, supra note 21, at 52-54.
139 Id. at 54.

There is evidence that the INS itself often used ethnic profiling it its
See Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration,
immigration enforcement.
Enforcement, and Subordination: The Consequences of Racial
Profiling After September 11, 34 CONN. L. REv. 1185, 1194 (2002)
(discussing a study by NYU School of Law Immigrant Rights Clinic,
which revealed that INS agents targeted people playing "Spanish
music" and having "Hispanic appearance" in its immigration
enforcement).
141 H.R. 2671 § 110.
142 See United States v. Brignon-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-86 (1975)
(holding that while border patrol may take into account a number of
factors in deciding whether reasonable suspicion exists to stop a car,
suspicion is not reasonable when it is based on ethnicity alone).
143 See Sessions & Hayden, supra note 17, at 340.
144 Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling After September 11: The
DepartmentofJustice Guidelines, 50 LOY. L. REv. 67, 67 (2004).
145 See Ashar, supra note 140, at 1193-94.
140
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changed drastically after 9/11. Prior to 9/11, polls showed
that most Americans believed racial profiling should be
eliminated. 146 Public opinion changed after 9/11, however,
to accept profiling "based on race, national origin,
nationality, and religion."' 147 The federal government's
own policies show that in the post-9/ll world, it is
acceptable, even expected and desirable,
to use ethnicity as
48
the primary cause for suspicion.1
Furthermore, the lack of training that officers would
receive under the CLEAR Act is alarming. The CLEAR
Act and HSEA provide for the creation of a "training
manual" and "pocket guide" for law enforcement agencies
and call for the DHS to make training sessions available
through various means. 149 Both acts, however, make clear
that these provisions "shall not be construed as making any
immigration-related training a requirement for, or
prerequisite to" immigration enforcement. 150 Thus, the acts
would authorize local police to act in the same capacity as
immigration officers, although providing little or no
training. Immigration law is one of the most complicated
and oft-changing areas of American law. 151 It even can be
difficult for immigration attorneys and federal immigration
agents to keep track of the various nuances that are
continually changing in the field of immigration law. How,
then, are local and state police officers, whose jobs are not
to specialize in immigration matters, to adequately
understand the complex laws?
Sharon L. Davies, Reflections on the Criminal Justice System after
September 11: Profiling Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 45, 46 n.5
146

(citing Gallup poll in which 81% of respondents revealed a disapproval
of profiling practices).
147 Johnson, Racial Profiling,supra note 144, at 68; see also
Davies,
supra note 146, at 45 n.6.
48 See Ashar, supra note 140, at 1191-96.
49
' H.R. 3137 § 10; S. 1362 § 9.
"50 H.R. 3137 § 10(e)(3); S. 1362 § 9(c).
151 See

Medige, supra note 94, at 11 (discussing the "steady stream of
federal and state legislation [that] has changed aspects of immigration
law and the rights of immigrants over the past several years").
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The lack of adequate training increases the very real
potential for mistreatment and civil rights violations. The
immunity provisions of the CLEAR Act' 52 make the
rectification of such problems unlikely. Indeed, supporters
of the CLEAR Act are right to worry about the potential
liability that local police face when they engage in
immigration enforcement. In just one of many prior
instances, police officers in Katy, Texas, faced lawsuits in
1994 stemming from the detentions of over eighty Latinos
suspected of being illegal immigrants, but who were, in
153
fact, either United States citizens or legal residents.
Such examples also prove that opponents of the CLEAR
Act have a basis for their concerns about the potential for
abuse at the hands of poorly trained police who are charged
with the difficult task of enforcing immigration laws along
with their many other duties.
V.

The Policy Behind the CLEAR Act
A. The False Presumption that Illegal
Immigrants are Terrorists and Criminals

The CLEAR Act also should be rejected because it
is premised on bad policy: the equation of illegal
immigrants to terrorists and criminals. The presumption
that illegal immigrants are dangerous criminals is clear
the Clear Law
from the title of the legislation:
The
Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act.
presumption is also clear from the rhetoric of the Act's
supporters. Representative Norwood, the main sponsor of
the CLEAR Act, contends that drastic measures are
necessary to stop "the hordes of vicious foreign criminals
invading our country to murder, rape, and molest

52

' H.R. 3137 § 11.

153 IACP, supra note 128, at 4.
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Americans."' 54 Indeed, proponents of the CLEAR Act and
HSEA come to press conferences and legislative sessions
equipped with stories of undocumented immigrants who
155
had committed heinous crimes against Americans.
Proponents also carry with them the stories of the nineteen
foreign hijackers who terrorized America and the three
156
hijackers who had previous encounters with police.
Measures like the CLEAR Act, we are to assume, would
prevent such terrorists and criminals from infiltrating
America.
Little besides anecdotal evidence exists, however,
that tackling illegal immigration and removing
undocumented immigrants will make the country any safer.
Very seldom is any proof presented that immigrants,
documented or undocumented, are more likely than others
to commit violent crimes. 157 The construction of the
debate, though, leads one to believe that undocumented
immigrants are by nature terrorists or violent criminals of
some kind. Such rhetoric ignores proof that the majority of
Representative Charlie Norwood, A Five-Minute Address to the
U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 29, 2005), availableat
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/speech/ga09_norwood/CLEARspeech.
html.
155 See Prepared Statement of Michelle Malkin, supra
note 9
(discussing gang rape of a Queens, NY mother by illegal aliens with
long criminal records and an illegal alien accused of kidnapping and
raping a nine-year old girl); CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing,supra note 5, at
2 (statements by Rep. Hostetler) (recounting the same stories of Queens
mother and nine-year old girl); Press Release, Norwood, June 30, 2005,
supra note 2 (telling story of "an illegal alien and convicted criminal
154

being sought for the . . .kidnapping, molestation, and murder" of a

young girl in Georgia).
56 See Prepared Statement of Sen. Saxby Chambliss, State and Local
Authority to Enforce Immigration Law:
Evaluating a Unified
Approach for Stopping Terrorists, Testimony before the U.S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., and
Citizenship (Apr. 22, 2004), availableat
http://judiciary.senate.gov/memberstatement.cfm?id= 1156&witid=2
624.
157 See Legomsky, supra note 56, at 109 (noting that "[i]mmigrants...
are neither more nor less law-abiding than the native-born U.S.
population").
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undocumented immigrants come to America seeking
work, 158 not to wreak havoc. 1 59 Under the CLEAR Act,
even a young child brought to the country by his or her
parents could be considered a "criminal." Furthermore, a
large percentage of those considered "illegal immigrants"
are actually people who entered the country on legal visas,
but who overstayed or otherwise violated the terms of their
visas. 160 This could include, for example, those who
mistakenly believe they do not need to renew their
temporary visas while in the process of having their status
adjusted. Under the CLEAR Act, a person would have to
prove that "an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship
or physical illness" caused his or her visa violation in order
to not be charged with a felony offense.
Furthermore, by perpetuating the myth of
immigrants as terrorists and criminals, legislation like the
161
CLEAR Act has the potential to increase racial tensions.
As noted earlier, race and immigration are closely linked in
the minds of most Americans.1 62 People of certain races
and ethnicities are generally presumed to be immigrants.
The CLEAR Act, by painting the picture of immigrants in a
dangerous light, will possibly lead to increased stereotyping
and marginalization of certain races and ethnicities.

158 See Espenshade, supra note 38, at 211.
159 See Immigration & Naturalization Services (INS) Interior
Enforcement Strategy: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Border Sec., and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 2 (2002) (statement of Rep. Gekas, Chairman of the Subcomm.
on Immigration, Border Sec., and Claims).
160 Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented Immigrants
& the NationalImagination, 28 CONN. L. REv. 555, 594 n.95 (1996).
161Romero, supra note 21, at 52.
162 Supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
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B. The Consequences of Co-opting
Immigration Policy into Anti-Terrorism
Policy
It is clear that immigration policy is inextricably
linked with anti-terrorism policy. 163 As a result, it has
become impossible to discuss immigration without
reference to national security concerns. The fact that
immigration policy is shaped in the context of other policy
is not new. Immigration has often been an area of law
highly vulnerable to changes in other areas that have little
to do with immigration. For example, immigration became
a key issue during the heated welfare debate of the mid1990s. California's Proposition 187 reflects this attitude
because the legislation was aimed at denying public
benefits to "undeserving" aliens.' 64 Congress also included
provisions excluding immigrants from public benefits in its
anti-welfare legislation, the Personal Responsibility and
Work Reconciliation Act of 1996. 165 In the mid-i 990s,
immigration policy was co-opted by economic and welfare
policy; in post-9/11 America, immigration policy has been
co-opted by anti-terrorism policy.
When legislators view immigration exclusively in
terms of national security, they lose sight of what really is
appropriate immigration policy. 166
Consider that
immediately preceding the 9/11 attacks, lawmakers were on
the verge of enacting measures that would liberalize
immigration policy. 167 Immediately after the attacks,
however, the direction of immigration policy abruptly
changed. This was, more than anything, a reactionary
move. The nation was justifiably shaken by the attacks and
163 See

supra Part II.D.

64 See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
165 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
166 See Tumlin, supra note 16, at 1228 (stating that "immigration policy
has lost its independent policy agenda").
167 See generally,Hines, supra note 65.
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New immigration
was left feeling very vulnerable.
on the basis
first-and-foremost,
proposals were evaluated,
of national security policy.168 Even those legislators who
generally support liberalized immigration reform are
understandably hesitant to oppose any measure
characterized as "necessary" for national security.
At the same time, the CLEAR Act and other
immigration legislation in its vein are not merely reactions
to the threat of terrorism. Rather, the emergence of what
some label a "new nativist" movement, which is
characterized by harsh immigration laws, predated 9/11,169
although the movement lost some steam at the turn of the
millennium. 170 The 9/11 attacks created a new incentive to
fight illegal immigration, and, for many, the attacks
justified disdain toward immigrants. Linking immigration
with terrorism, however, merely masks those factors that
initially led to the anti-immigration reaction of the previous
Supporters of new, stricter immigration
century.171
measures now feel justified in arguing that lax immigration
enforcement can, and has, produced disastrous effects on
the country. It becomes easier for the nation to invoke
harsher immigration reform under this guise of national
security.
VII.

Conclusion

Given the history of United States immigration law
and policy, that immigration is playing such a key role in a
national security-minded America comes as no surprise.
168

169

Tumlin, supra note 16, at 1228.
See generally, IMMIGRANTS OUT!

THE NEW NATIvISM AND THE

ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES

(Juan F. Perea ed.,

New York Univ. Press 1997).
170 See supra Part II.C.

Chavez, supra note 56, at 69 (listing as factors related to
increasing anti-immigration sentiment xenophobia as a result of an
increasing number of non-white immigrants, economic recession, the
failure of previous laws, and emerging nationalism).
171 See
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As immigration attorney Ash Bali points out, "periods of
national crisis have revealed the vulnerability of
immigrants' rights to hysteria and repression." 7 2 In many
ways, the current "war on terrorism" has manifested itself
in the domestic front as a "war on immigration." The
CLEAR Act is one example of the anti-immigration and
anti-terrorism forces colliding, because the Act is justified
on the grounds of protecting America from both the
"criminal" aliens and the potential terrorists coming across
our borders. The Act, however, seems to rely on the false
presumption that undocumented immigrants are inherently
dangerous. Moreover, by coercing local and state police to
act as immigration agents, the CLEAR Act has the potential
to prevent effective community policing while increasing
the potential for abuse of ethnic minorities at the hands of
police. Hopefully, the language of national security will
not cloud these very real concerns from the view of the
lawmakers currently considering the Act.
Lawmakers
should recognize that, more than anything, the CLEAR Act
is unnecessary anti-immigration legislation, and as such, it
should be opposed.

172

Ash U. Bali, Changes in Immigration Law and Practice After

September 11: A Practitioner's Perspective, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL'Y & ETHICS J. 161 (2003).
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